So whatâ€™s the best explanation for why America invaded Iraq? Hubris born of success. From Panama to the Gulf War to Bosnia to Kosovo, America spent the decade preceding 9/11 intervening successfully overseas. As a result, elites in both parties lost the fear of war they felt after Vietnam. In 1988 Reagan had been so afraid of another Vietnam that he refused to send ground troops to Panama. In 1990 John McCain had responded to Iraqâ€™s invasion of Kuwait by declaring, â€œIf you get involved in a major ground war in the Saudi desert, I think [public] support will erode significantly … We cannot even contemplate, in my view, trading American blood for Iraqi blood.â€ In his emotional 1991 speech opposing the Gulf War, John Kerry had mentioned Vietnam 10 times. In his 2002 speech supporting the invasion of Iraq, by contrast, he mentioned Vietnam only once.
It wasnâ€™t only military success that by 9/11 had eroded Americaâ€™s caution. It was economic and ideological success, too. By 2001 the boom of the late 1990s had turned Americaâ€™s budget deficit to surplus. For top Bush officials, the lesson was that just as America had overcome the deficits Reagan amassed while fighting the Cold War, America could easily overcome whatever temporary debt the Bushies incurred fighting the â€œwar on terror.â€ As Dick Cheney declared during the run-up to Iraq, â€œReagan proved deficits donâ€™t matter.â€
The final ingredient was ideological success. In the 1980s, before democratization swept across Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Latin America, prominent liberals and conservatives would have found the idea that democracy could take root in a country like Iraq utterly fanciful. As late as 1983, Irving Kristol, the â€œgodfatherâ€ of neoconservatism, was writing that â€œthe traditionsâ€”political, religious, culturalâ€”that shape Latin American thinking and behavior are such as to make it exceedingly difficult for the countries of Southern America to proceed along the [democratic] lines followed by Northern America and Western Europe.â€ By 2001, however, â€œneoconservatismâ€ had been redefined by ideological optimists like Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, and Irvingâ€™s son, William, men shaped by the very democratic transformations that Irving Kristol had deemed impossible.
Obviously, it took 9/11 for the Bush administration to rally the public behind the Iraq war. But had the success of the 1990s not bred so much military, economic, and ideological overconfidence on both sides of the aisle, itâ€™s unlikely they would have tried.
The key thing that has changed in the decade since America invaded Iraq is not Barack Obamaâ€™s election. Itâ€™s the collapse of American hubris. Far fewer people in either party now claim that America can easily topple and occupy distant lands. Far fewer believe we can conduct foreign policy as if â€œdeficits donâ€™t matter.â€ Far fewer believe that the peoples of the Middle East yearn for secular, liberal, pro-American democracies. That doesnâ€™t mean the United States has stopped acting like a superpower. Weâ€™ve simply turned to methods that cost less money and fewer American lives.
Itâ€™s an old story. After Korea left the United States exhausted, Eisenhower told the CIA to overthrow leftist Third World governments because it could do so more cheaply than the Marines. When Richard Nixon could no longer sustain a large U.S. ground presence in Vietnam, he began bombing ferociously from the air. Now Obama has pulled U.S. ground troops from Iraq, is pulling them from Afghanistan, and is fighting al Qaeda with drones instead.
Thereâ€™s nothing particularly glorious, or moral, about empire on the cheap. But at least war will no longer cost America so much money and so many young American lives. Maybe weâ€™ve grown wiser over the last 10 years. Or maybe weâ€™ve just lost the epic ambition that true tragedy requires.