Saddam conceals weapons well

It amazes me to hear some of the inspectors talk about the incompetence of Iraq's scientists and engineers. These are people who rebuilt all of Iraq's services -- ranging from power stations to refineries to bridges -- after the Gulf War (news - web sites). They seem uninformed because of Saddam's instructions. Back in 1973, when I was head of the physics department, which was involved in the planning of the nuclear-weapons program, and Saddam had taken over as Atomic Energy chairman, his words to us in a meeting were clear: ''Pretend that you are not as well informed or as bright as you really are. A bright Iraqi is perceived as a danger to our enemies, but a mediocre one is not.'' That meant telling inspectors: ''I don't understand the question, and I have no idea what this means.''

We also got a lot of inadvertent help from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is also participating in the latest inspections. The IAEA had formed the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) group to tell the world how nuclear-weapons programs are concealed. Its massive report, published around 1980, had a volume specifically dedicated to the telltale signs of weapons. The INFCE volume was must-reading for all Iraqi department heads. It was translated into Arabic and distributed free to all who might need the information. It was a handy how-to guide for throwing inspectors off course.